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Abstract We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some
goods can be reduced by making commitments that reduce °exibility. We
show that such consumption commitments can induce consumers with risk-
neutral underlying utility functions to be risk averse over small variations in
income, but sometimes to seek risk over large variations. As a result, optimal
employment contracts will smooth wages conditional on being employed, but
may incorporate a possibility of unemployment.
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An individual whose purchases involve future ¯nancial obligations is likely
to have a di®erent attitude toward income risk than one who chooses more
°exible arrangements. Negative income shocks can have serious ¯nancial
consequences for the holder of a mortgage, for example, perhaps even in-
ducing foreclosure. Renting instead of buying provides some insulation from
income shocks: failing to make the rent may force one to move, but with
lower transactions costs and without the risk of a capital loss. One could
achieve even more °exibility by living in hotels, adjusting the quality as
needed in response to income °uctuations. Analogous e®ects can arise even
without explicit ¯nancial obligations. The expected utility from a vacation
home may be jeopardized by negative income shocks, even if there are no
further payments to make and the home itself is not at risk.
We refer to choices that give rise to rigidities in consumption as consump-
tion commitments. Consumption commitments can be valuable. Purchasing
a house typically gives greater bene¯t per dollar spent than does renting an
apartment.1 Hotels are yet more expensive than apartments. Owning a
vacation home near a ski resort can be cheaper than regularly renting.
Consumption commitments can introduce elements of risk aversion into
the behavior of people whose underlying preferences are risk neutral. More
important for this paper, vulnerability to income shocks is a consequence
of consumption decisions, giving rise to utility gains from coordinating con-
sumption and labor market decisions by matching those times that consump-
tion would be especially vulnerable to income °uctuations with times that
income is secure.2 We show that this coordination can induce \economies
of scale" in risk bearing. A consumer who makes relatively few commit-
1Not only are there tax bene¯ts associated with home ownership, but purchasing allows
one to make idiosyncratic capital improvements that increase the utility of the housing,
while renting typically entails a premium because of moral hazard concerns.
2Several papers make a similar point. Ellingsen and Holden [8] analyze a model in
which workers make purchases of durable goods based on expectations about future wages.
When those expectations are high, workers will make large purchases, and then will resist
lower wages more than they would have had they had more pessimistic expectations (and
consequently purchased fewer durables). Ellingsen and Holden [9] analyze a model in
which worker indebtedness worsens their bargaining position vis a vis employers. Chetty
[5] demonstrates empirically the importance of commitments in estimating risk aversion.
1ments, perhaps in response to a relatively risky income, may ¯nd the cost
of bearing additional risk relatively low. An individual faced with a given
amount of lifetime income uncertainty then may rationally choose to con-
centrate as much risk as possible into his or her early years, in return for
a relatively secure income (and more consumption commitments) in later
years. The risk aversion induced by consumption commitments may thus
be coupled with risk seeking preferences over making such commitments. As
a result, optimal employment contracts may smooth wages conditional on
unemployment, but feature employment risk.
Section 2 introduces a model of consumption commitments and employ-
ment contracts. Section 3 establishes conditions under which wage smooth-
ing and layo®s are optimal in a simple model, while Section 4 extends the
argument to an intertemporal model. Section 5 discusses the results.
2 Consumption Commitments
2.1 The Firm
We consider a ¯rm whose pro¯ts are a function of the quantity of worker-
consumers N 2 < that it hires and the realization of a state. Revenue in
state 2 (the bad state) is given by the function f : < ! <+, and in state 1
(the good state) by ®f, for ® > 1. The good state occurs with probability
p.
We assume that f is twice continuously di®erentiable on <+, with f0 > 0,




is bounded below by µ¤ > 0. This is the case, for example, for any power
function satisfying our assumptions.
We represent the workers hired by the ¯rm as the interval [0;N], with
j 2 [0;N] being an index that identi¯es di®erent workers. An employment
contract speci¯es the wage rate to be paid in each state i 2 f1;2g, denoted
by wi, and speci¯es which of the N employees are to be employed in that
state, with the remainder (if any) being laid o®.
Let Â2(j) be a (measurable) indicator function equal to 1 if employee j
is employed in state 2 and equal to 0 if j is laid o®. Let





2Hence, n2 is the quantity of workers \kept on" in the bad state, and n1
the quantity of workers who are employed if the state is good and laid o®
otherwise. The ¯rm's revenues in state 1 are then given by ®f(n1 +n2) and
in state 2 by f(n2). Embedded in this notation is the assumption, sacri¯cing
no generality, that if the ¯rm is to lay o® workers, it will do so in the bad
state.
We assume the ¯rm faces three constraints in writing employment con-
tracts. First, the ¯rm cannot make payments to unemployed workers. We in-
terpret this as re°ecting moral hazard considerations. Unemployment com-
pensation provides insu±cient incentives to undertake home production or
seek alternatives.
Second, the ¯rm cannot pay a wage wi in state i 2 f1;2g that exceeds
the marginal product of labor in state i. This again re°ects moral hazard.
Making payments in excess of marginal products makes it tempting for the
¯rm to ¯re workers for alleged nonperformance.
Some limitation on the amount the ¯rm can pay to workers is essential
to our analysis. In its absence, an argument analogous to the \wage bill"
argument of Akerlof and Miyazaki [1] would ensure that the optimal labor
contract completely insures the worker against risk, featuring no wage °uc-
tuations and no unemployment. Our interest is in studying how optimal
contracts balance wage and unemployment risk, in the presence of some
imperfection that potentially forces the contract to contain some risk.
Finally, we assume that all workers who remain employed at the ¯rm
after the state of nature is realized receive the same wage. This simpli¯es
the calculations, but does not play an important role in the results.
The ¯rm's payo® is given by
p(®f(n1 + n2) ¡ w1(n1 + n2)) + (1 ¡ p)(f(n2) ¡ w2n2):
The ¯rm maximizes this payo® subject to the constraint that the employ-
ment contract provides workers with at least their reservation utility.
2.2 Worker-Consumers
The worker-consumer (also called either a worker or consumer) has a reser-
vation utility, interpreted as the value of alternative market activities, that
we denote by U > 0. The consumer's utility depends on two things: con-
sumption of a good x and consumption of services that can be obtained from
either of two other goods, y or z. The consumer has a constant-elasticity-
of-substitution utility function over x and (y + z), the level of services he
3receives from the goods y and z, given by
(°x½ + (1 ¡ °)(y + z)½)
1
½ : (1)
The constant-elasticity-of-substitution form for this utility function is not
essential to our results, but has the important advantage of allowing us to
talk precisely (by varying °) about the relative importance of the various
consumption goods.
The consumer is risk neutral, in the sense that his utility is linear along
rays through the origin:
(°(¸x)½ + (1 ¡ °)(¸y + ¸z)½)
1
½ = ¸(°x½ + (1 ¡ °)(y + z)½)
1
½ :
The goods y and z are perfect substitutes representing two di®erent ways
that the consumer can satisfy his desire for services. For example, y and z
may represent purchased housing and rental housing. We assume that the
consumer can purchase either y or z, but not both: he must choose one of
the two ways to get the relevant services.3
In a traditional model in which all goods have linear prices, whichever
of goods y and z had the higher price would be irrelevant. We depart
from the traditional model in two ways. First, we assume purchasing good
y involves a nontrivial commitment, while there is no such commitment
involved in purchasing z. Formally, we model this by assuming that there
is an ex ante market (before the state is realized) and an ex post market
(after the state has been realized) for the services provided by purchases of
y and z. Commitments to good y must be made in the ex ante market,
while trade in z occurs after the state is realized. Ceteris paribus, there is
an advantage to purchasing z rather than y, since purchases in the ex post
market can be conditioned on the realized state of the world. Second, we
assume that committing to good y (in the ex ante market) entails a ¯xed
cost plus a marginal cost. We normalize prices so that the price of x is one
and we normalize units of z and y so that the price of z is one. The cost of
committing to good y in the ex ante market is
h(y) =
(
¯ + ·y if y > 0
0 if y = 0;
3For example, rented and purchased housing are not easily combined into a single place
of residence. We could work with weaker versions of this assumption, with some additional
complication, as long as consumption commitments introduce su±cient rigidities in ex post
consumption.
4where 0 < · < 1 and ¯ > 0. Hence, the consumer can purchase the services
provided by goods y or z at a cheaper per unit price if he pays the ¯xed
cost of ¯ and purchases in the ex ante market. The nonlinear form of the
price of y is meant to capture the idea that securing services via good y is
cost e®ective only if consumption exceeds some minimum level. For example,
purchased housing may be ¯nancially attractive only above a given threshold
level of services.
The commitment to good y in the ex ante market, denoted by ^ y, can be
adjusted in the ex post market after the realization of the state is known,
but at a cost per unit di®erent from ·. Additional purchases of y can be
made at price ³ > 1, while portions of good y can be sold on the ex post
market, at price 1
Ã < ·. Purchases of y in the ex ante market thus come
at a lower marginal price than purchases of z, but adjustments to the level
^ y are more expensive. For example, buying a house with eight-foot ceilings
and then increasing the ceiling height to nine feet is more expensive than
buying a house with higher ceilings in the ¯rst place. Building a house with
three bathrooms and then selling one is ¯nancially worse than simply not
having installed three. We write the price relevant for such a reduction as
1
Ã so that larger values of Ã and ³ correspond to more rigid commitments.
Let [»]+ = maxf»;0g and [»]¡ = minf»;0g. If a consumer has wage wi










2 + (1 ¡ °)(y2 + z2)½)
1
½
subject to the budget constraints (for i = 1;2)
xi + zi + h(^ y) + ³[yi ¡ ^ y]+ +
1
Ã
[yi ¡ ^ y]¡ = wi;
and the constraints that the services be purchased via one or the other of y
and z, but not both:
^ yz1 = ^ yz2 = 0:
Suppose the consumer may be laid o® with probability q > 0 in state 2.

















5subject to the budget constraints
xi + zi + h(^ y) + ³[y1 ¡ ^ y]+ +
1
Ã






^ yz1 = ^ yz2 = 0:
The second budget constraint is a \no bankruptcy" constraint, capturing
a requirement that a consumer who is laid o® must still be able to earn
enough (by liquidating the commitment good ^ y) to meet her ¯xed payment
obligations for the good. Since 1
Ã < ·, this e®ectively requires the consumer
to set ^ y = 0 in order to respect the budget constraint in state 2|consumers
at risk of being laid o® cannot make commitments. We relax this assumption
in Section 4, noting for the moment only that this assumption introduces a
bias against layo®s.
2.3 Commitments and Utility
To gain insight into the consumer's utility maximization problem, ¯x a com-
mitment level ^ y > 0 and consider the ex post problem of choosing x and y
to




x + ·^ y + ³[y ¡ ^ y]+ +
1
Ã
[y ¡ ^ y]¡ = I;
where I is ex post net income (i.e., realized income minus the ¯xed commit-
ment cost, or wi ¡ ¯).
Figure 1 shows a representative budget line, marked I = x + ·y, and
the corresponding expansion path, given by the ray marked ·, identifying
optimal consumption as I varies. This would be the appropriate expansion
path if the consumer had paid the ¯xed cost ¯ and could now freely alter the
choices of good x and good y, at marginal price ·, in response to variations
in ex post income. Of course, this expansion path is doubly irrelevant: if
the consumer knew her ex post net income would be small, she would not
make a commitment, and once the commitment is made, she cannot adjust
the quantity of good y at price ·. However, this construction is a helpful
benchmark in assessing the consumer's ex post consumption. In particular,
if the there is no uncertainty about the consumer's ex post income and the
6x
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Figure 1: Expansion paths in the ex post market, identi¯ed by the corre-
sponding good-2 price.
consumer optimally makes commitment ^ y, then the resulting consumption
bundle will be given by the intersection of a budget constraint of the form
I = x + ·y with the ray ·.
Now suppose the consumer has committed to ^ y, and consider the optimal
consumption bundle as ex post income varies. The consumer faces a series of
budget constraints that are kinked at the quantity ^ y. Reducing the quantity
y below ^ y is accomplished by selling y at price 1
Ã < ·, giving a °atter
budget constraint for reductions in the commitment good. One such budget
constraint is shown, given by I0 = x + 1
Ãy for some I0. Increasing y above
^ y is accomplished by buying good y at price ³, giving a steeper budget line
(with one such line given by I00 = x + ³y).
The rays marked ³ and Ã are the expansion paths relevant if the con-
sumer could purchase unlimited amounts of good y at prices ³ and 1
Ã in the
ex post market (again, thinking of the consumer as having paid the fee ¯),
respectively. The consumer's ex post expansion path, given the rigidities
induced by a commitment ^ y, is shown in Figure 2. If the consumer's ex
post net income happens to hit just the right level, the consumption bun-
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Figure 2: Ex post expansion path, given the consumer has incurred the ¯xed
cost and chosen commitment ^ y.
dle is on the expansion path ·, with y = ^ y. In this case, the commitment
to ^ y poses no constraints. Moderately higher incomes prompt no change
in consumption of the commitment good and increased consumption of the
noncommitment good, until hitting the expansion path ³, at which point the
consumer proceeds along this path. Similarly, reductions in income prompt
reductions in x until hitting and following path Ã.
Figure 3 shows the indirect utility, denoted by ~ U, as a function of ex post
gross income I (i.e., income before incurring the ¯xed cost ¯), presuming a
commitment ^ y. The ray marked · would be the indirect utility function if
the consumer purchased services via good y, at price ·. This path is linear,
since the consumer is risk neutral if allowed to vary x and y freely at prices
1 and ·, but does not pass through the origin, re°ecting the ¯xed cost ¯.
For a given commitment ^ y, there is an income level I(^ y) at which the con-
sumer's unconstrained optimal purchase of good y (at price ·, given ¯xed
cost ¯) will equal ^ y, yielding point A in Figure 3. Realized incomes above
this level, given commitment ^ y, initially induce increases in the consump-
tion of good x; but leave y unchanged, until reaching point B in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Indirect utility function, giving utility as a function of ex post
gross income I, for commitment ^ y.
At this point, the consumer supplements the commitment ^ y by purchasing
additional quantities of good y at price ³ (as well as additional quantities
of good x). The indirect utility function is then again linear, with a °at-
ter slope representing the higher (than ·) price ³.4 Similarly, reductions in
income below I(^ y) initially prompt no reduction in good y, until point C
is reached, after which some units of good y are sold at price 1
Ã and the
indirect utility function is again linear. Putting these together, the indirect
utility function is strictly concave in a neighborhood of I(^ y). Having made a
commitment ^ y, the consumer is risk averse over small variations in income,
as the cost of adjusting y channels any variation into good x. However, the
4Notice that the indirect utility function is di®erentiable at point B. The extension of
this linear segment emanating from point Bpasses above point A. This segment is part
of a linear indirect utility function that would be relevant if the consumer faced prices
(1;³) for goods (x;y), with an ex post income subsidized by (³ ¡ ·)^ y, so that the ¯rst ^ y
units of good y can be purchased at price ·, but with no restrictions on purchases of good
y. At ex post income I(^ y), the consumer can then buy the bundle that gives the utility
corresponding to point A, but optimally chooses to purchase less y and more x (given
prices (1;³)), for a higher utility.
9indirect utility function is not globally concave, even weakly, introducing
the possibility of risk-seeking behavior over large variations in income. In
particular, there are circumstances in which the consumer would welcome
lotteries that put positive probability on zero income.
3 Optimal Layo®s
This section examines optimal employment contracts in a single-period model
(extended to multiple periods in Section 4). This allows us to identify the
key features of optimal employment contracts with a minimum of clutter.
Our ¯rst result is that if consumers do not make consumption commit-
ments (i.e., set ^ y = 0), then there are no layo®s and the wage equals the
marginal product of labor in each state. The consumer is risk neutral in
this case, removing any advantage from paying wages that are not equal to
marginal products, while any contract with layo®s is dominated by a full-
employment contract with suitably adjusted wages. Lemma 1 couples this
result with obvious su±cient conditions for commitments to be suboptimal.
Lemma 1
(1.1) If the optimal employment contract does not induce commitments,
then there are no layo®s and ®f0 = w1 > w2 = f0.
(1.2) If either · > 1, ¯ is su±ciently large, or ° is su±ciently large,
then the optimal contract features no commitments.
Proof.
(1.1) Suppose that the optimal employment contract does not induce
commitments and features layo®s (i.e., n1 > 0). If w1 = ®f0(n1 + n2),
then a marginal reduction in n1 has no e®ect on the ¯rm's payo® while in-
creasing consumer utility (by decreasing the layo® probability), introducing
slack into the consumers' participation constraint that the ¯rm can exploit
to increase its payo®. If w1 < ®f0(n1 + n2), then the ¯rm can decrease w2
and increase w1, while preserving expected payments to the consumer and
expected pro¯ts (and hence expected utility, here exploiting the consumer's
risk neutrality in the absence of commitments), until w1 = ®f0(n1 + n2);
at which point n1 can again be pro¯tably reduced. If there are no layo®s
and the expected wage falls short of the expected marginal product in ei-
ther state, then the ¯rm can pro¯tably increase its employment. Section 6
contains details.
(1.2) If · > 1, then the cost of buying good 2 via commitments exceeds
the cost of making the same purchase on the spot market. Similarly, if
10¯ is su±ciently large, the cost h(^ y) of buying the quantity ^ y via commit-
ments exceeds the cost of purchasing that amount on the spot market for a
su±ciently large interval [0; ^ y¤] that the consumer makes no commitments.
Fixing ¯ > 0 and ·, if ° is su±ciently large, then the optimal consump-
tion of good y is su±ciently small that the ¯xed cost ¯ is prohibitive, again
ensuring that no commitments are made.
The rigidities associated with consumption commitments are the only
force in this model pushing consumers away from risk neutrality. Speci¯cally,
if we relax our maintained assumption and let ³ = 1
Ã = · < 1, so that the
level of y can be adjusted ex post without penalty, and if ¯ is su±ciently
small (but not necessarily zero), then consumers will make commitments
(i.e., will choose ^ y > 0), but the optimal contract will again feature no
layo®s and wages equal to marginal products:
Lemma 2 If ³ = 1
Ã = · < 1 and ¯ is su±ciently small, then the optimal
employment contract induces ^ y > 0, but features no layo®s and ®f0 = w1 >
w2 = f0.
Proof. Let ³ = 1
Ã = · < 1 and let ¯ be small enough that ¯ + ·z¤
i < z¤
i ,
i = 1;2, where z¤
i is the optimal state-i consumption of good z when y is
unavailable. This ensures that the optimal contract induces the consumer
to set ^ y > 0. Because the consumer is risk neutral ex post, the argument
proving Lemma 1.1 then ensures that there are no layo®s and ®f0 = w1 >
w2 = f0.
We now return to the ex post rigidities induced by consumption com-
mitments when 1
Ã < · < 1 < ³. We consider two ways in which layo®s can
be arranged. In the ¯rst, they are random. If proportion q of the consumers
must be laid o® in state 2, then every consumer faces a layo® probability
of q, and the layo® draws are made after the state is realized. In the other,
layo®s are concentrated. Proportion q of the consumers are again drawn to
be laid o® should state 2 occur, with each consumer equally likely to be
drawn, but with the draws made before the ex ante market opens. Unlike
random layo®s, concentrated layo®s allow workers to know prior to making
consumption decisions whether they are at risk of being laid o®. Concen-
trated layo®s in this setting reappear in our intertemporal model in the form
of a seniority-based layo® scheme.
Random layo®s preclude consumption commitments, since the budget
constraint would be violated if a consumer who had made a commitment is
11laid o®. Concentrated layo®s allow consumers who are not at risk of a layo®
to make commitments. This gives the latter an advantage:
Lemma 3 If the optimal contract involves layo®s, then there exists a con-
tract with concentrated layo®s that maximizes the ¯rm's payo®. If some
consumer strictly prefers to make consumption commitments (set ^ y > 0)
under such a contract, no random-layo® contract maximizes the ¯rm's pay-
o®.
Proof. Let layo®s be random. The consumer then necessarily sets ^ y = 0.
Switching to concentrated layo®s while preserving other aspects of the em-
ployment contract (including the layo® probability) preserves the ¯rm's pay-
o® and does not eliminate any consumption possibilities available to the con-
sumer, ensuring that the consumer (and hence the ¯rm) cannot fare worse
under concentrated layo®s. Concentrated layo®s must be strictly better for
the consumer (and hence the ¯rm) if, when not at risk of being laid o®, the
consumer strictly prefers commitments.
The ¯rst step toward examining the potential optimality of layo®s is
to note that consumption commitments introduce risk aversion over small
variations in ex post income, causing the ¯rm to optimally smooth wages:
Lemma 4 When ¯ and · are su±ciently small, consumers make commit-
ments. The optimal employment contract then smooths wages, in the sense
that w2 = f0(n2) and w1 < ®f0(n1 + n2).
Proof. We provide an outline of the argument, leaving the details to Sec-
tion 6. It is immediate that commitments are optimal for su±ciently small ¯
and ·. Suppose w2 = f0 and w1 = ®f0. If there are layo®s, then a marginal
reduction in n1 while preserving n2 leaves the ¯rm's payo® una®ected, while
increasing consumer utility (by reducing the layo® probability), introducing
slack in the participation constraint that the ¯rm can exploit to increase its
payo®. In the absence of layo®s, we have w1 > w2, and a marginal reduction
in n2 (holding n1 = 0) again leaves the ¯rm's payo® unchanged, while allow-
ing wage smoothing. It is apparent from Figure 3, along with the optimality
of consumption commitments (implying that realized incomes fall in the
concave portion of the indirect utility function), that this wage smoothing
increases consumer utility.
Our basic result builds on the ex post risk aversion introduced by con-
sumption commitments to show that if commitments are su±ciently valuable
12and induce su±cient rigidity in the consumption of good y, optimal contracts
will feature layo®s. The following is a special case of Proposition 2 (obtained
by setting ± = 0 in Section 4), and we defer proof to the consideration of
Proposition 2.
Proposition 1 For su±ciently small ¯ > 0, there exist ¹ ·(¯) > 0, ¹ °(¯) > 0;
¹ ³(¯) and ¹ Ã(¯) such that for all · < ¹ ·(¯); ° < ¹ °(¯), ³ > ¹ ³(¯) and Ã > ¹ Ã(¯),
the optimal contract features layo®s.
Layo®s are potentially optimal because a worker who has made consump-
tion commitments is ex post risk averse. The ¯rm responds by smoothing
the consumer's wages across states, but is constrained in doing so by the
marginal product of labor in state 2. Layo®s relax this constraint by re-
ducing state-2 employment and hence increasing the marginal product. The
conditions of the proposition ensure that commitments are optimal (¯ and
· small) and that the rigidities introduced by consumption commitments
are relatively severe (° small and ³ and Ã large), and hence the concave
portion of the indirect utility function in Figure 3 is quite concave, mak-
ing wage smoothing particularly valuable.5 Of course, this wage smoothing
comes at the cost of possibly being laid o®, a large negative income shock.
As Figure 3 shows, however, the consumer may actually seek risk involving
this outcome.
Remark. Layo®s are potentially optimal in our model because they re-
duce employment in the bad state, relaxing the marginal-product constraint
on wages. Could the ¯rm instead relax this constraint by retaining all of
its workers, but having each work fewer hours? Laying o® half the workers
or halving the time each works may leave the ¯rm with the same e®ective
workforce,6 but these have quite di®erent e®ects on the workers. When the
¯rm lays o® half its workforce, the remaining workers can be paid as much as
f0(1
2N), while if it retains all the workers but cuts their hours by half, each
worker can be paid at most half as much, or 1
2f0(1
2N), a disadvantage for a
policy designed to boost state-2 worker incomes. More generally, retaining
all workers but having each work ¸ < 1 times full employment would allow
the ¯rm to pay up to ¸f0(¸N) per worker. If the elasticity of the production
function ¡
f00(N)N
f0(N) is below 1, as is the case if f is a power function, reducing
5It is immediate from Lemma 2 that layo®s will not be optimal if commitments are
not su±ciently rigid.
6We ignore here the possibility that output might depend not only on the number of
man-hours available, but also the number of workers.
13hours would force a reduction in payments to workers, exacerbating rather
than smoothing ex post payment variations and ensuring that hours reduc-
tions would never be part of an optimal contract, even when layo®s could
be.7
Remark. Layo®s allow ex post incomes to be smoothed. A more e®ective
response would be income °uctuation insurance, o®ered either by the ¯rm or
by a third party. Our results will not hold in the presence of such insurance.
We suspect that moral hazard considerations preclude third-party income
°uctuation insurance, and preclude the ¯rm's fully insuring workers when
laid o® (though we have not modelled these factors). We have incorporated
an explicit constraint on the ¯rm's ability to insure against income °uctu-
ations while employed, in the form of a prohibition on wages in excess of
marginal products.
4 An Intertemporal Model
The model analyzed in the previous section illustrates how an optimal con-
tract can include layo®s to smooth wages. Since it is a one-period model, it
precludes an obvious method for smoothing wages, namely consumer bor-
rowing and saving. In this section, we describe how the analysis can be
extended to an intertemporal setting.
4.1 The Firm
The ¯rm is in¯nitely-lived. Workers are potentially employed for two peri-
ods. The ¯rm signs a contract with a young worker at the beginning of the
worker's tenure with the ¯rm, specifying the wage as a function of the state,
in each period of employment.
We examine a steady state. In any period, the ¯rm contracts with N
workers, employing n2 consumers in the bad state and N = n1 + n2 in the
good state, where n1 may be zero. We assume that in each period the ¯rm
has an equal number of young and old workers. At the beginning of each
period the ¯rm hires a set of young workers to replace the old workers of
the previous period. Layo®s, if they occur, are concentrated, meaning that
only young workers are at risk (unless more than half of the workers are laid
7If the elasticity exceeds 1, reducing hours will allow an increase in state-2 payments,
though this increase will not be as large as that allowed by layo®s. Of course, reducing
hours rather than laying o® workers has the advantage of eliminating the possibility of
zero wage.
14o®), who once again take draws for their layo® eligibility at the beginning
of the period. We assume that the ¯rm can condition a worker's wage on
the state, but not the worker's age or the previous-period state. Relaxing
this assumption complicates the details of the analysis but does not vitiate
the result. The result of this steady state analysis is that the ¯rm's pro¯t
maximization problem is very similar to the one it faces in the single-period
model of the previous section.
4.2 Worker-Consumers
Each worker-consumer lives for two periods. Let ^ y(j) be the consumer's
commitment in period j and hj(^ y(j)) be the corresponding cost, where
h1(^ y(1)) =
(
¯ + ·^ y(1) if ^ y(1) > 0
0 if ^ y(1) = 0
h2(^ y(2)) =
(
¯ + ·^ y(2) if ^ y(2) > 0
0 if ^ y(2) = 0:
The consumer thus faces no constraints on the ability to adjust the level
of the commitment good between periods. Given enough time, people can
adjust their consumption of housing services not by incremental changes to
their current house, but by moving to a new one.8 As in the one-period
model, the presence of the ¯xed cost ¯ in the second period captures the
fact that once again the commitment is drawn from a technology in which
there is a premium on a su±ciently large scale of services.
If the consumer chooses a given level ^ y in each period, then ¯ + ·^ y is
paid in each period. One might view the cost of purchased housing as more
heavily weighted toward the beginning. We can readily interpret the model
as one in which commitment ^ y is made in the initial period at cost (1+±)(¯+
·^ y). Nothing further need be paid if ^ y is maintained in the second period,
while otherwise the value of the remaining service °ow (±(¯ +·^ y)) must be
sold and a new commitment made at cost h(^ y) (again, with a transaction
cost easily accommodated). Since we have incorporated no capital market
imperfections into our model, this is equivalent to the current formulation.
The consumer's utility maximization problem is now
max
xi(j);^ y(j);yi(j);zi(j);i;j2f1;2g
p(°x1(1)½ + (1 ¡ °)(y1(1) + z1(1))½)
1
½ + (1 ¡ p)(°x2(1)½ + (1 ¡ °)(y2(1) + z2(1))½)
1
½
8There may be transaction costs associated with such a move. Adding such costs to the
model will only reinforce the rigidities induced by consumption commitments and hence
our results.
15+±[p(°x1(2)½ + (1 ¡ °)(y1(2) + z1(2))½)
1
½ + (1 ¡ p)(°x2(2)½ + (1 ¡ °)(y2(2) + z2(2))½)
1
½]
where xi(j), for example, is the quantity of good x consumed in period j in
state i, subject to
zi(j)^ y(j) = 0; i;j = 1;2;
and, for each combination of state i(1) and i(2) in periods 1 and 2,
xi(1)(1) + zi(1)(1) + h1(^ y(1)) + ³[yi(1)(1) ¡ ^ y(1)]+
+ ±
³
xi(2)(2) + zi(2)(2) + h2(^ y(2)) + ³[yi(2)(2) ¡ ^ y(2)]+
´
· wi(1)(1) + ±wi(2)(2) ¡
1
Ã
[yi(1)(1) ¡ ^ y(1)]¡ ¡ ±
1
Ã
[yi(2)(2) ¡ ^ y(2)]¡;
where wi(j) is the wage paid in period state i and period j.
As before there are no restrictions on the consumer's ability to tailor x
to the period and state. At the beginning of the contract, before learning
the ¯rst-period state, the consumer has an opportunity to satisfy his service
requirement via commitment, that is to choose a positive level ^ y(1) at cost
h1(^ y1). The consumer can buy additional units of y, but must do so at
price ³. The consumer can reduce consumption of good y below ^ y(1), but
in the course of doing so can recover only the fraction 1
Ã(^ y(1)¡y(1)) of the
cost. This sequence is repeated in the second period, beginning with a new
commitment ^ y2 made at cost h2(^ y2).
4.3 Equilibrium
Consider ¯rst a consumer facing an employment contract with no layo®s.
Commitments will be optimal if ¯ and · are su±ciently small. Given our
steady-state assumption, we will have w2(1) = w2(2) = f0(n2). If the opti-
mal contract features no variation at all in the consumer's income, so that
w1(j) = w2(j), then the consumer would set ^ y(1) = ^ y(2) and make no trans-
fers between periods. In general, it will be optimal for the ¯rm to smooth
the consumer's income by setting w1(j) < ®f0(n1 + n2), but not to smooth
income perfectly. In this case, a consumer who encounters the bad state
in the ¯rst period will transfer income from the second period to the ¯rst,
and a consumer encountering the good state will save some income for the
second period. However, the consumer necessarily faces some income risk in
the second period, and hence optimally stops short of equalizing ¯rst-period
expenditures in the good state and the bad state, incurring some risk in the
¯rst period in order to smooth the extreme values of the risky second-period
16income. Borrowing and saving mitigate the risk faced by the consumer, but
do not eliminate it.
A consumer facing a layo® risk will again prefer that the risk be con-
centrated. Given the lack of any capital market imperfection, the consumer
will be indi®erent between having the risk concentrated in the ¯rst or second
period of employment. We make the realistic assumption that only young
workers are laid o®, a convention that we suspect re°ects unmodelled capi-
tal market imperfections. Notice that consumers at risk of being laid o® are
no longer automatically precluded from making commitments. A consumer
facing a layo® risk in (only) the ¯rst period can borrow from second-period
income to cover a ¯rst-period commitment should the bad state occur in the
¯rst period.
Once again, layo®s allow the ¯rm to relax the marginal product con-
straint on the relatively low state-2 wage. Section 6 proves:
Proposition 2 For su±ciently small ¯ > 0, there exist ¹ ·(¯) > 0, ¹ °(¯) > 0;
¹ ³(¯) and ¹ Ã(¯) such that for all · < ¹ ·(¯); ° < ¹ °(¯), ³ > ¹ ³(¯) and Ã > ¹ Ã(¯),
the optimal contract features layo®s.
The basic idea of the proof is that when it is costly to quickly adjust
the level of the commitment in the face of income shocks, there will be a
disproportionate adjustment in the quantity of the other good, x. Dispro-
portionate adjustments of x will not be on an expansion ray out of the origin,
and hence, the consumer will exhibit risk aversion over these adjustments.
Borrowing and saving will mitigate the size of the optimal adjustment, but
not eliminate them. The choice between contracts without employment and
contracts with layo®s is then essentially between bearing an equal, moderate
amount of risk in each period and bearing more risk in the ¯rst period in
order to decrease the risk in the second period. When commitments are
important, the latter wins.
Remark. It is clear that expanding the model beyond two periods only
requires additional notation. Our assumptions that there are only two states
and only two consumption technologies also make for rather stark equilibria.
In the contracts of interest, those una®ected by layo® risks make commit-
ments. Those at risk either make no commitments (in the single-period
model) or possibly (in the multiperiod model) make a commitment involv-
ing the same ¯xed cost, though not necessarily the same level of service, as
those not at risk. A richer model would allow for shocks of varying sizes
17and a variety of commitment technologies featuring di®erent trade-o®s be-
tween ¯xed and marginal costs, along with many periods. Workers at various
stages of their tenure with the ¯rm would face di®erent layo® risks and make
commitments of di®erent types and sizes. Optimal employment contracts in
such models are shaped by the same forces as in our simpler analysis, but
with considerably more complicated details.
5 Discussion
Endogenous risk aversion. Consumers who make consumption commit-
ments in our model behave is if they are risk averse over small variations in
income, despite their linearly homogeneous utility functions. More gener-
ally, the utility functions we can hope to observe are inferred from behavior
that is the product of an interaction between preferences and the technology
for converting income into consumption. Di®erent technologies may lead us
to di®erent and potentially misleading inferences concerning risk aversion.
For example, we may observe that consumers are risk neutral, concluding
that insurance has no value, while the opening of an insurance market may
give rise to both risk-averse behavior and active demand for insurance.9
Concentrated risks. Conditional on facing a risk of being laid o®, the
worker would prefer to concentrate this risk in as few states as possible. In
essence, there are economies of scale in bearing risk, inducing workers to
lump risks together rather than disperse them.
Habit formation. Our model generates behavior that is similar to that
of many habit formation models.10 Attanasio [2] discusses a typical habit
formation model which in essence decreases an individual's e®ective current
consumption by a constant times the individual's depreciated aggregate pre-
vious consumption, making the individual averse to downward adjustments
in consumption. If the force of habit formation is strong enough, it could
lead to optimal employment contracts that include layo®s in a manner sim-
ilar to that shown in this paper.11
9Chetty [5] also makes this point.
10See Deaton [7] and Attanasio [2] for surveys of the habit formation literature and
Chetty and Szeidl [6] for an examination of the connection between consumption commit-
ments and habit formation.
11The models exhibit some di®erences. For example, our model would suggest nontrivial
heterogeneity, linked to observable characteristics, across individuals in their aversion
to downward adjustments in consumption|an individual who has made consumption
18Morale. Bewley [3, 4] discusses the tendency of employers to insure wage
but not layo® risk, in order to avoid detrimental morale e®ects that espe-
cially accompany wage reductions. This di®erential e®ect on morale is in
turn traced to a convention that wage reductions (but not layo®s) are a vio-
lation of fairness or social norms. We agree that adverse morale e®ects may
pose signi¯cant barriers to wage reductions. But why are wage reductions
devastating for morale, reductions in overtime for hourly employees less so,
and appropriately conducted layo®s less so? One possibility is that morale
e®ects reinforce employment practices that are customary, with these prac-
tices having become customary because they have economic advantageous
linked to their interaction with consumption commitments.12
Permanent separations. Our model is based on the idea that workers
may be laid o® when young, in response to temporary shocks, in return
for more secure subsequent employment. However, the basic logic of our
results carries over to the case in which ¯rms face permanent shocks that
preclude recalling laid-o® workers. In this case, workers who were employed
under a no-layo® contract would face a permanent wage cut should the ¯rm
su®er a shock. If ¯rms o®ered contracts incorporating layo®s, workers would
be permanently laid o® following a shock, and would seek employment at
another ¯rm. Consider a multiperiod environment in which workers are
long-lived. A worker who accepts a contract with layo®s realizes that if a
shock occurs soon after he is hired, he will be ¯red and will have to seek
another job. If no shock occurs for some period of time, however, he will
have su±cient seniority that he will no longer be at risk. The trade-o®s in
our model apply here: the bene¯ts of making commitments gives the worker
an incentive to bunch his risks, making layo® contracts attractive.
6 Appendix: Details of Proofs
Lemma 1.1. Suppose that the consumer sets ^ y = 0. Then the consumer
is risk neutral and the consumer's indirect utility function can be written
as pw1 + (1 ¡ p) n2
n1+n2w2. Attaching multiplier ¸ to the consumer's par-
ticipation constraint and multiplier ¹ to the constraint that n1 ¸ 0 (one
commitments will be more averse to income shocks than an individual who has avoided
commitments.
12Bewley [3, Chapter 13] explains that layo®s have the advantage focussing adverse
e®ects on those who are no longer with the ¯rm, but also that they have morale e®ects for
the entire workforce that are small compared to those of wage reductions (Chapter 11).
19easily veri¯es that workers will not optimally be laid o® in the good state),
while ignoring the constraint that wages not exceed marginal products, the
¯rst-order conditions for the ¯rm's pro¯t maximization problem are:
n1 : p(®f0(n1 + n2) ¡ w1) ¡ ¸(1 ¡ p)
n2w2
(n1 + n2)2 + ¹ = 0 (2)
n2 : p(®f0(n1 + n2) ¡ w1) + (1 ¡ p)(f0(n2) ¡ w2) + ¸(1¡p)
n1w2
(n1 + n2)2 = 0(3)
w1 : ¡p(n1 + n2) + ¸p = 0 (4)




Assume that n1 > 0, so that there are layo®s, and hence ¹ = 0. Coupling
this with the equality ¸ = n1 + n2, which we can derive from either of (4)
or (5), we can rewrite (2){(3) as
















or f0(n2) = 0, a contradiction. Hence, there must be no layo®s. We can
also conclude, from (3) and the constraint that wages not exceed marginal
products, that w1 = ®f0(n2) and w2 = f0(n2) which in turn implies that
w1 > w2.
Lemma 4. We proceed quickly through some obvious cases. If both wages
fall short of the corresponding marginal products, then the ¯rm could in-
crease pro¯ts by hiring more labor at the existing wage rate while preserving
the existing probability of a layo® (and hence preserving worker utility). If
w1 equals its marginal product and w2 falls short of its marginal product,
then either (1) w2 < w1, in which case the ¯rm can increase w2 and de-
crease w1, preserving expected wage payments while preserving or increasing
worker utility and leading to a state at which both wages fall short of their
marginal products (at which point the ¯rm can increase pro¯ts by hiring
more labor); or (2) w2 ¸ w1, in which case there must be layo®s in the bad
state and the ¯rm can increase pro¯ts and consumer utility by hiring more
labor in the bad state (and hence reducing the layo® probability). Hence, we
20must have w2 = f0. If w2 > w1, then either smoothing wages (if w1 < ®f0)
or reducing n1 (if w1 = ®f0) again increases consumer utility while preserv-
ing the ¯rm's payo®, allowing the ¯rm to exploit the resulting slack in the
participation constraint to increase pro¯ts. Thus, we must have:
®f0 ¸ w1 ¸ w2 = f0: (6)









pw1 ¸ ¹ U;
where ~ Ui(w1;w2) is the indirect utility function identifying the consumer's
utility when state i is realized, when not vulnerable for layo®s and given
wages w1 and w2. Notice that in the presence of commitments, both wages
are relevant for determining state-i utility and ~ Ui is in general not linear.
Attaching multiplier ¸ to the participation constraint, ´ to the constraint
f0 ¡ w2 ¸ 0, and ¹ to the constraint n1 ¸ 0, the ¯rst-order conditions for
the ¯rm's pro¯t maximization problem are:
n1 : p(®f0(n1 + n2) ¡ w1) ¡ ¸
n2
(n1 + n2)2(p~ U1 + (1 ¡ p)~ U2)
+¸p
n2
(n1 + n2)2w1 + ¹ = 0 (7)
n2 : p(®f0(n1 + n2) ¡ w1) + (1 ¡ p)(f0(n2) ¡ w2)
+¸
n1
(n1 + n2)2(p~ U1 + (1 ¡ p)~ U2) ¡ ¸p
n1
(n1 + n2)2w1 + ´f00(n2) = 0 (8)


























¡ ´ = 0: (10)
Now suppose ¯rst that there are no layo®s, so that n1 = 0. Then (8)
becomes:
p(®f0(n2) ¡ w1) + (1 ¡ p)(f0(n2) ¡ w2) + ´f00(n2) = 0: (11)
21Now suppose that both wages equal marginal products. Then (11) can be


























dw1 + (1 ¡ p)d~ U2
dw1
pd~ U1



















where ~ U(w1;w2) = p~ U1(w1;w2) + (1 ¡ p)~ U2(w1;w2) gives expected utility
conditional on not being at risk of being laid o®, u is the consumer's direct
utility function (1), (x¤
i;y¤
i ) is the optimal consumption bundle in state i,
and the ¯nal equality follows from an envelope argument. The outer two








2 , yield a
contradiction.
Now suppose that the optimal employment contract features layo®s in
state 2. (It is straightforward to exclude the optimality of layo®s in state
1.) Suppose the ¯rst weak inequality in (6) is an equality. Since n1 > 0, we
have ¹ = 0. From (7), we then have
¡¸
n2
(n1 + n2)2(p~ U1 + (1 ¡ p)~ U2) + ¸p
n2
(n1 + n2)2w1 = 0:
As a result, we have
pw1 = p~ U1 + (1 ¡ p)~ U2:
This is a contradiction. The maximum utility achieved when making no
consumption commitments and faced with wages w1 in state 1 and 0 in
state 2 is pw1. A consumer who has income w2 > 0 in state 2 and makes
no commitments must then receive a higher utility, and a consumer with
income w2 who optimally makes commitments must receive a utility at least
as high as the latter, giving the contradiction. Hence, we must have ®f0 >
w1 ¸ w2 = f0.
Proposition 2. We assume that the optimal contract features no layo®s
and seek a contradiction. The optimal no-layo® contract must then feature
22N = n2, n1 = 0, and ®f0(n2) > w1 ¸ w2 = f0(n2). The ¯rm's pro¯ts are in
general given by,
p[®f(n1 + n2) ¡ w1(n1 + n2)] + (1 ¡ p)[f(n2) ¡ w2n2];
where the assumption that there are no layo®s currently gives n1 = 0. Be-
ginning with the optimal no-layo® contract, we consider an adjustment that
decreases n2, adjusting w2 so as to preserve equality with the marginal prod-
uct of labor in the bad state (i.e., dw2=dn2 = f00(n2)), increasing w1 similarly,
and adjusting n1 so as to preserve expected pro¯ts. It is a contradiction to
show that this adjustment increases consumer utility.
We di®erentiate with respect to n2, giving:
p
¡













Because f0(n2) = w2, dw1=dn2 = dw2=dn2 = f00(n2), and n1 = 0 by as-




p[®f0(n2) ¡ w1] ¡ f00(n2)n2
p[®f0(n2) ¡ w1]
: (13)
Let ~ U(w1;w2) be the indirect utility function, giving expected utility as
a function of the wages w1 and w2, conditional on not being at risk of a
layo®. This indirect utility is of the form
~ U(w1;w2) = p(~ U11(w1;w2) + ±(p~ U21(w1;w2;1) + (1 ¡ p)~ U22(w1;w2;1)))
+ (1 ¡ p)(~ U12(w1;w2) + ±(p~ U21(w1;w2;2) + (1 ¡ p)~ U22(w1;w2;2)));
where ~ U11(w1;w2) is the ¯rst-period utility given the good state (with ~ U12(w1;w2)
in the case of the bad state) and ~ U21(w1;w2;1) (for example) is the second-
period utility, given that the good state is realized in the second period (the
second subscript) and given that the good state was also realized in the
¯rst period (the argument 1 in the function). The latter is relevant because
the ¯rst-period state determines how much the consumer borrows or saves,
and hence second-period (state-contingent) income. Let ~ V similarly be the
indirect utility function for a consumer at risk of layo® in the ¯rst period
(only). This function takes a similar form, but di®ers from ~ U in recognition























































































































or, using the fact that the consumer's expected utility ~ U(w1;w2) must equal
























Now ¯x ¯ and · su±ciently small that the consumer makes commitments,
and hold ¯ ¯xed while letting · decrease. As · and ° get small, U=f0(n2)
is bounded (because the ¯rm optimally sets f0(n2) ¸ ¯, to ensure the fea-
sibility of consumption commitments) while d~ U
dw1 + d~ U
dw2 approaches in¯nity
(because small · allows increases in w2 to yield ever larger increases in ^ y,
the marginal utility of which remain large as ° gets small). The inequality
(and contradiction) thus holds if ®¡w1=f0(n2) is positive and bounded away
from zero. It is positive by (the counterpart for the two-period model of)
Lemma 4. We then note that w1=f0(n2) approaches one, for ¯xed ¯ and ·,
as ° gets small and ³ and Ã get large, since in the limit increments in the
state-1 wage are worthless. We then need only set ° su±ciently small and
³ and Ã su±ciently large.
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